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CIRCULAR DEFINITIONS OF WHAT CONSTITUTES AN 
EMPLOYEE: DETERMINING WHETHER THE PARTNERS OF 
SIDLEY AUSTIN BROWN & WOOD QUALIFY AS EMPLOYERS OR 
EMPLOYEES UNDER FEDERAL LAW 
INTRODUCTION 
Federal employment discrimination statutes1 are aimed at providing 
protection to “employees.”2  However, the statutes fall short of providing clear 
guidance as to what constitutes an employee.3  The definitional provisions of 
most statutes utilize inadequate and ambiguous language.4  For example, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, Title VII, and the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act all contain similar ambiguous and circular definitions.5  All 
 
 1. There are a number of federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination, including the 
following: (1) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits job discrimination based 
on an individual’s religion, sex, race, color, or national origin, (2) the Equal Pay Act of 1963 
(EPA), which protects from sex-based discrimination, (3) the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967 (ADEA), which protects individuals who are forty and older from job-related 
discrimination, (4) Title I and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 
which protects individuals with disabilities that work for private companies or for state and local 
government from employment discrimination, (5) Sections 501 and 505 of the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973, which prohibits discrimination against people with disabilities who work for the federal 
government, and (6) the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which allows for monetary damages in 
instances of intentional job discrimination.  See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, Federal Laws Prohibiting Job Discrimination: Questions and Answers (May 24, 
2002), http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/qanda.html. 
 2. Stephen M. Olson & Jeremy A. Mercer, Employment Law, Physician-Shareholders and 
Law or Accounting Partners—Are They Employers or Employees?, K & L ALERT (Kirkpatrick & 
Lockhart LLP, Boston, Mass.), April 2003.  The Acts apply to “employers” with a stated 
minimum number of employees.  Id.  Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (2000), a business or 
entity must employ a minimum of fifteen employees in order to qualify as an “employer.” 
 3. See Whether Partners are ‘Employees’, WASH., D.C. EMP. L. LETTER (Washington, 
D.C.), Mar. 2003.  Provisions defining “employer” and “employee” are difficult to understand in 
many of the Acts.  The Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) defines 
“employee” as “any individual employed by an employer.”  E.R.I.S.A., Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 
3(6), 88 Stat. 833, 834 (1974).  The Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA) also use the very same definition.  See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(3) (2000); 29 
U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2000). 
 4. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(3) (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2000). 
 5. Kristin Nicole Johnson, Resolving the Title VII Partner-Employee Debate, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 1067, 1070–71 (2003). 
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three statutes define employee as “an individual employed by an employer.”6  
Lack of clarity among the statutes makes it difficult to determine whether 
individuals should be treated as employees or employers under various 
circumstances.  Furthermore, such vague definitions leave many questions as 
to what factors actually determine one’s status as an employee. 
Should lawyers who serve as partners in a law firm always be considered 
employers, thereby barred from the protection of employment discrimination 
laws?  This question is not easily answered.  Modern law firms present courts 
with a unique problem: the difficulty of delineating between those who are 
afforded protection under the federal anti-discrimination statutes (employees) 
and those who are not (employers).7  In order to effectively answer this 
question, courts need to reexamine and expand traditional notions of who is a 
covered employee under the federal anti-discrimination acts. 
It is important for courts to establish a uniform standard to determine what 
factors qualify an individual as an employee because many circuits are split on 
how to reach this conclusion.8 Many different tests exist, each with 
particularized criteria.9  Further, it is important to have a proper understanding 
of who qualifies as an employee because it will determine who may bring a 
cause of action under the federal anti-discrimination acts.10  Therefore, it is 
time to solidify and determine what factors constitute an employer and an 
employee. 
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sidley Austin Brown & 
Wood,11 the Seventh Circuit opened the door to the possibility that equity 
partners in a law firm may be considered employees and may therefore be 
afforded protection under federal anti-discrimination statutes.12  Regardless of 
the final outcome, the decision in Sidley will likely “send shock waves through 
law firm executive committees” nationwide and will have a lasting effect on 
 
 6. Id.; see Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(f) (2000); A.D.E.A., 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (2000); 
A.D.A., 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (2000).  Courts treat Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA “as 
standing in pari passu and endorse the practice of treating judicial precedents interpreting one 
such statute as instructive in decisions involving another.”  Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 
985 (1st Cir. 1997); see also Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979). 
 7. Catherine Lovly & Matthew J. Mehnert, Something Every Lawyer Needs to Know: The 
Employer-Employee Distinction in the Modern Law Firm, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 663, 
664 (2004). 
 8. Id. at 665–66. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Peter J. Prettyman, How to Discriminate Against Old Lawyers: The Status of Partners, 
Shareholders, and Members Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act With Addendum 
Discussing Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells, 37 IND. L. REV. 545, 546 
(2004). 
 11. EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 12. Employment Bibliography Roundup of Select Articles for Employment Practitioners, 
EMP. L. STRATEGIST (ALM Law Journal Newsletters, Phila., Pa.), Dec. 2002. 
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how law firms are managed.13  It appears likely that courts will adopt the 
analysis of the Supreme Court’s 2003 Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, 
P.C. v. Wells decision and use the common law right of control test to resolve 
the issue of whether partners may be considered employees.14  Law firm 
partners that do not possess substantial control and decision-making power 
within their firms should be considered employees and should be protected 
under the federal anti-discrimination statutes.  Therefore, the thirty-two 
demoted partners at Sidley should be considered employees and should be 
protected under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.15 
This Casenote examines whether partners of a law firm should be protected 
by federal anti-discrimination statutes, or in the alternative, whether partners 
should be barred from suing for discrimination because they are employers.  
Part I of this Note sets forth the facts, history, and holding of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Clackamas.  Part I also explains various tests established 
by the Supreme Court and the circuit courts to determine what constitutes 
one’s status as an employee.  Part II describes the facts of the Sidley case, the 
common law control test, and cases following the Clackamas decision.  Part III 
analyzes the Sidley case and the common law control test.  Part III also 
discusses why the Sidley decision matters.  Particularly, the analysis of this 
Note focuses on the outcome and implications of Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood and any impact the 
decision may have on the infrastructure of law firms in America. 
I.  THE PRECEDENTS 
A. Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells 
In the 2003 Clackamas decision, the Supreme Court utilized the common 
law agency control test to determine who qualifies as an employee under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).16  Along with the control test, the 
Supreme Court used the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 
(EEOC) guideline factors to resolve the issue of whether partners may be 
considered employees.17 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. See generally Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003) 
(finding that the common law right of control test and the EEOC guideline factors should be used 
to make the employer/employee distinction). 
 15. The congressional purpose behind the ADEA is to protect individuals forty and over 
from job-related discrimination.  A.D.E.A., 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2000).  Further, the Act aims to 
protect against discrimination between individuals protected by the Act.  See A.D.E.A., 29 U.S.C. 
§ 630(f) (2000). 
 16. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449. 
 17. See id. at 451. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1332 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:1329 
In Clackamas, the Supreme Court acknowledged that federal anti-
discrimination statutes, including the ADA, provide nominal and circular 
definitions of what constitutes an employee.18  In an attempt to remedy this 
problem, the Court set forth a control test to determine who qualifies as an 
employee.19  The Court stated that when Congress used the term employee 
without defining it, “Congress intended to describe the conventional master-
servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine.”20  At 
common law, the master-servant relationship focused on the master’s control 
over the servant.21 
In Clackamas, there was a question as to whether four physicians, 
directors, and shareholders of a medical clinic were employers or employees.22  
The Court faced a difficult decision.  Certain factors supported the conclusion 
that the physicians were employers.23  For example, the physicians controlled 
the operation of the clinic, shared the clinic’s profits, and were liable for 
medical malpractice claims.24  However, evidence on the record also supported 
the conclusion that the physicians were employees.25  For example, the record 
demonstrated that the physicians earned annual salaries, complied with the 
standards and rules set by the clinic, and reported to a superior.26 
The plaintiff, a terminated employee, advocated that the Court determine 
whether the physicians were employees by asking whether they were 
“partners.”27  The Court rejected this approach, concluding that “[t]oday there 
are partnerships that include hundreds of members, some of whom may well 
qualify as ‘employees’ because control is concentrated in a small number of 
managing partners.”28 
 
 18. Id. at 444. 
 19. Id. at 449–50.  The Court was persuaded by the EEOC’s focus on the common law 
element of control.  Id. at 449.  The common law definition of control examines the master-
servant relationship, specifically, the master’s control over the servant.  Id. at 448. 
 20. Id. at 445 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322–23 (1992)). 
 21. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 448.  The Court noted that “‘servant’ . . . refers to a person 
whose work is controlled or is subject to the right to control by the master.”  Id. (citing THE 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(2) (1957)). “A servant is a person employed to perform 
services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance 
of the services is subject to the other’s control or right to control.”  Id. (citing THE RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (1957)). 
 22. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 442. 
 23. Id. at 451. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 451 n.11. 
 27. Clarkamas, 538 U.S. at 445.  The plaintiff advocated this approach rather than the 
common law approach.  Id. 
 28. Clarkamas, 538 U.S. at 446; see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79 
(1984) (Powell, J., concurring). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] CIRCULAR DEFINITIONS OF WHAT CONSTITUTES AN EMPLOYEE 1333 
With nothing but past precedent to work from, the Court turned to the 
EEOC for guidance.29  The EEOC employs a six-factor test to consider the 
question of whether an individual is subject to an organization’s control.30  The 
non-exhaustive list contains the following: 
1) Whether the organization can hire or fire the individual or establish rules 
and regulations of the individual’s work; 2) Whether and, if so, to what extent 
the organization supervises the individual’s work; 3) Whether the individual 
reports to someone higher in the organization; 4) Whether and, if so, to what 
extent the individual is able to influence the organization; 5) Whether the 
parties intended that the individual be an employee, as expressed in written 
agreements or contracts; 6) Whether the individual shares in the profits, losses, 
and liabilities of the organization.31 
Under the EEOC approach, particular titles, such as “partner,” “shareholder,” 
or “manager” are inadequate as a means to determine whether a person is, or is 
not, an employer.32  To the contrary, the EEOC approach considers all 
pertinent factors and occurrences involved in a relationship before determining 
whether an individual is an employee.33 
The Court was persuaded by the EEOC’s six-factor test which analyzed 
said factors and focused on the common law touchstone of control.34  The 
Court reasoned that all incidents in an employment relationship should be 
analyzed when making a determination of an individual’s status as an 
employer or employee, and that no one factor should be decisive.35 
In adopting the approach advocated by the EEOC, the Court concluded 
that courts should examine how a company or organization treats an individual 
when determining whether federal discrimination statutes are applicable to that 
 
 29. Lovly & Mehnert, supra note 7, at 671. 
 30. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449–50.  The EEOC’s six-factor inquiry lists several factors 
relevant to determining an individual’s status as an employee.  Courts look to the six factors when 
deciding coverage of partners, officers, members of boards or directors, and major shareholders.  
Craig A. Crispin, Clackamas Gastroenterology v. Wells, An Assessment by Craig A. Crispin, 
Counsel for Wells 5–6 (American Bar Association Annual Meeting Paper, 2003), available at 
http://www.bna.com/bnabooks/ababna/annual/2003/crispin.doc. The EEOC’s approach 
emphasizes that a person’s title or rank, such as partner or director, should not automatically 
remove an individual from the Act’s coverage.  Id. at 5.  The EEOC’s main goal is to protect 
individuals who are vulnerable to the kinds of treatment that the anti-discrimination statutes are 
intended to prohibit.  Id. at 4. 
 31. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449–50 (quoting EEOC Compliance Manual § 605:0009). 
 32. Olson & Mercer, supra note 2. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id.; see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 35. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 451. 
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individual.36  Courts need to look beyond labels and corporate form to analyze 
whether an individual manages and operates the business or, alternatively, 
whether the individual is controlled by the business.37  Overall, the Court ruled 
that that the “employer” is the entity that owns, manages, and operates the 
business.38  The Court emphasized that determining whether an individual is an 
employer or an employee requires an analysis that looks past the individual’s 
title and beyond the title of the organization.39 
The Court reached its conclusion in Clackamas after carefully analyzing 
different tests and methods used to make the employer/employee distinction.  
Therefore, case law leading up to the decision inevitably impacted the Court’s 
ruling. 
B. Supreme Court History Leading to Clackamas 
Prior to Clackamas, the Supreme Court had first addressed the 
partner/employee controversy in its 1984 decision Hishon v. King & 
Spalding.40  In Hishon, the Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit and 
held that when an associate is being considered for partner, the associate 
qualifies as an employee for the purposes of Title VII.41 
Petitioner Elizabeth Anderson Hishon alleged that King & Spalding had 
promised to consider her for partner on a fair and equal basis.42  Hishon further 
alleged that the firm rejected her for admission to the partnership on the basis 
of her sex, in violation of Title VII.43  Hishon asserted that King & Spalding’s 
acts were covered under Title VII because she was denied a term, condition, or 
privilege of employment.44  Hishon further alleged that King & Spalding used 
the possibility of partnership to entice her into accepting an associate 
position.45 
The Court held that if Hishon’s allegations that the firm had promised to 
consider her for partnership fairly and equally were proven, partnership 
consideration was a term, condition, or privilege of her employment contract 
and, therefore, was governed by Title VII.46  The Court further determined that 
 
 36. Timothy M. Singhel, Supreme Court Broadens Class of “Employees” Subject to the 
Federal Antidiscrimination Laws (Holland & Knight LLP, Atlanta, Ga.),  EMP., LAB. & BENEFITS  
(June 2003). 
 37. See id. 
 38. See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 450; see also Singhel, supra note 36. 
 39. See Singhel, supra note 36.  Specifically, the lower courts will be required to evaluate 
the six factors established by the EEOC.  Id. 
 40. 467 U.S. 69 (1984). 
 41. Id. at 77. 
 42. Id. at 71–72. 
 43. Id. at 72. 
 44. Id. at 73–74. 
 45. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 71. 
 46. Id. at 75. 
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Hishon likely had a cognizable claim under Title VII because the benefit of 
partnership consideration appeared to have been directly linked to an 
associate’s status as an employee.47  The Court noted in its decision that 
employers may not evade Title VII by labeling employees partners.48 
In the 1992 decision, Nationwide Mutual v. Darden,49 the Supreme Court 
recognized that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA) provided a nominal and circular definition of the term employee.50  
The Court concluded that when Congress uses the term “employee” and does 
not define it, Congress intends to describe the conventional master-servant 
relationship as understood by common law agency doctrine.51  Under the 
common law agency approach, the following factors help determine whether a 
party is an employee: 
[(1)] the hiring party’s right to control the [production of the 
product;] . . . [(2)] the skill required; [(3)] the source of the 
instrumentalities and tools; [(4)] the location of the work; [(5)] the 
duration of the relationship between the parties; [(6)] whether the 
hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; 
[(7)] the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long 
to work; [(8)] the method of payment; [(9)] the hired party’s role in 
hiring and paying assistants; [(10)] whether the work is part of the 
regular business of the hiring party; [(11)] whether the hiring party is in 
business; [(12)] the provision of employee benefits; and [(13)] the tax 
treatment of the hired party.52 
The aforementioned list of factors is not exhaustive.53  Under the common law 
agency approach, all incidents of a relationship must be analyzed because no 
one factor is decisive and courts must look at all factors surrounding the 
circumstances.54 
Supreme Court decisions prior to Clackamas did not provide clear 
guidance for circuit courts regarding how to make the employer/employee 
distinction.  As a result, circuit courts established different approaches to 
resolve the question of what constitutes an employee. 
 
 47. Id. at 76. 
 48. Id. at 77. 
 49. 503 U.S. 318 (1992). 
 50. Id. at 323. 
 51. Id. at 322–23. 
 52. Id. at 323–24. 
 53. Id. at 324. 
 54. Nationwide Mutual, 503 U.S. at 324. 
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C. Circuit Splits 
Circuit courts have addressed the employer/employee issue by utilizing a 
number of different tests.55  These tests set the stage for the Clackamas 
decision and gave the Supreme Court a number of approaches from which to 
choose.  For example, the Tenth Circuit utilized the “total bundle” approach in 
order to determine whether a partner was an employee.56  Under this approach, 
courts look at the total bundle of partnership characteristics in making a 
determination.57  The Eleventh Circuit “look[ed] to the particular 
circumstances of the case at hand and, in so doing,” focused “not on any label, 
but on the actual role played by the claimant in the operations of the involved 
entity and the extent to which that role dealt with traditional concepts of 
management, control, and ownership.”58 
Some courts use specific tests to determine what constitutes an employer.  
For example, the Ninth Circuit59 has utilized the “economic realities” or “right 
of control test.”60  Under this approach, courts look at factors including: 
compensation, claimant’s liability for the company’s losses, management 
structure of the company, and the claimant’s role in management.61 
Another type of test that several circuit courts have embraced is the hybrid 
test.62  Under this approach, courts combine the “common law agency” test and 
the “economic realities” test.63  Under this approach, the main factors the 
courts evaluate are: (1) the partner’s ownership in the company, (2) the 
partner’s managerial power, (3) the partner’s compensation, (4) the partner’s 
job security, and (5) the partner’s liability for firm losses.64 
 
 55. See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 442–44 (2003). 
 56. See Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 276 (10th Cir. 1987). 
 57. See id. 
 58. Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co., 925 F.2d 1398, 1400–01 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 59. See Strother v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 867 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 60. Leonard Bierman, So, You Want to be a Partner at Sidley & Austin?, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 
969, 992 (2003). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See, e.g., Drescher v. Shatkin, 280 F.3d 201, 203 (2d Cir. 2002); Serapion v. Martinez, 
119 F.3d 982, 990 (1st Cir. 1997); Devine v. Stone, Leyton & Gershman, P.C., 100 F.3d 78, 81 
(8th Cir. 1996); Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 443–44 (6th Cir. 1996); Hyland v. 
New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 797 (2d Cir. 1986); Hickey v. Arkla Indus., 
Inc., 699 F.2d 748, 751–52 (5th Cir. 1983); Goudeau v. Dental Health Servs., Inc., 901 F. Supp. 
1139, 1143–44 (M.D. La. 1995); Vick v. Foote, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 330, 333–34 (E.D. Va. 1995), 
aff’d, 82 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 1996); Jones v. Baskin, Flaherty, Elliot and Mannino, P.C., 670 F. 
Supp. 597, 602 (W.D. Pa. 1987), aff’d, 897 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1990) (without opinion); see also 
Lovly & Mehnert, supra note 7, at 681. 
 63. Lovly & Mehnert, supra note 7, at 681. 
 64. See id. at 682–87. 
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In the 1977 Burke v. Friedman65 decision, the Seventh Circuit, interpreting 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, classified partners as possible 
“persons” that can act as an employer.66  The court analyzed whether four 
defendant partners of an accounting firm could be considered employees.67  
The four partners had part ownership in the firm and wholly operated the 
firm.68  In addition, the partners were responsible for hiring and firing, and 
made the final decision to fire plaintiff Barbara Burke.69  The court adopted a 
per se rule as it relates to partners and concluded that where partners own and 
manage the operation of a business, they cannot be considered employees.70  
The court held that the equity partners of the accounting firm were employers 
under Title VII.71 
In the 1996 Sixth Circuit decision Simpson v. Ernst & Young,72 the court 
applied the hybrid test.73  The Appellee (Simpson) was an accountant that was 
terminated by Ernst & Young, a large accounting company, after a merger.74  
Simpson brought suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act75 
(ADEA) and ERISA, and brought a supplemental state claim.76  Ernst & 
Young argued that Simpson was a partner rather than an employee and that, 
therefore, the action was not cognizable under the ADEA or ERISA.77 
Ernst & Young, in a matter of eighteen months, terminated 120 partners 
over the age of forty, while admitting 162 new partners under the age of 
 
 65. 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 66. Id. at 869.  Title VII defines an employer in part as “a person engaged in an industry 
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty 
or more calendar year weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a 
person . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000). 
 67. Burke, 556 F.2d at 868–69.  Pursuant to Title VII, “employee” is defined not as a 
“person” but rather as “an individual employed by an employer.”  42 U.S.C § 2000e(f) (2000).  
The Seventh Circuit analyzed whether a partner can be considered an employee under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(f).  Burke, 556 F.2d at 868. 
 68. Burke, 556 F.2d at 869. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id.; Lovly & Mehnert, supra note 7, at 677–78. 
 71. Burke, 556 F.2d at 869–70. 
 72. 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 73. Id. at 443.  The hybrid test is a combination of the common law control test and 
economic realities test.  See id. 
 74. Id. at 438–39. 
 75. The ADEA covers private employers, state and local government, and employment 
agencies that employ twenty or more persons.  Crispin, supra note 30, at 2.  In order for an 
individual to support a prima facie case of an ADEA violation, he must prove he “lost out 
because of his age.”  Simpson, 100 F.3d at 444 (citing O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers, 
517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996)).  Additionally, courts must find that age was a “determining factor” in 
a person’s discharge or demotion and that such an act was willful. Id. 
 76. Simpson, 100 F.3d at 439. 
 77. Id. 
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forty.78  Simpson was replaced by a partner under the age of forty.79  Although 
Simpson was given the title “partner,” the firm’s business, assets, and affairs 
were directed exclusively by a ten to fourteen member Management 
Committee.80  Simpson had no significant management control, no meaningful 
voting rights, no fiduciary relationship, and no job security.81  Simpson was not 
a bona fide partner by any stretch of the imagination.82  “For all practical 
purposes, [Simpson] was an employee with the additional detriment of having 
promised to be liable for the firm’s losses.”83 
The trial judge concluded that Simpson was an “employee” for the 
purposes of ADEA, ERISA, and Ohio state law.84  Further, the trial court 
entered judgment for Simpson on his ERISA claim, concluding that his 
discharge was in retaliation for persistent requests concerning his retirement 
benefits.85  The jury returned a verdict in favor of Simpson on his ADEA 
claim, finding that age was a “determining factor” in Simpson’s discharge and 
that his termination was “willful.”86  The jury awarded past earnings, past 
benefits, future earnings, and future benefits.87  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.88 
Although these cases all established important tests that assuredly 
influenced the Clackamas decision, the cases in Part III.C. of this Note, infra, 
have applied Clackamas and demonstrate the effectiveness of the Clackamas 
decision. 
III.  SIDLEY SHOULD BE EVALUATED USING THE CLACKAMAS CONTROL TEST 
A. The Facts of Sidley 
In 1999, Sidley & Austin89 demoted thirty-two of its equity partners after 
implementing a retirement policy which changed the mandatory retirement age 
for partners from sixty-five to a discretionary age for any partner who was 
 
 78. Id. at 441. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Simpson, 100 F.3d at 441. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 442. 
 84. Id. at 439. 
 85. Id. at 440. 
 86. Simpson, 100 F.3d at 439. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 444. 
 89. On May 1, 2001, Sidley & Austin merged with Brown & Wood.  EEOC v. Sidley & 
Austin, No. 01-C-9635, 2002 WL 206485, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2002).  The firm is now 
known as Sidley Austin Brown & Wood.  Id. 
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between the ages of sixty and sixty-five.90  Thirty of the thirty-two demoted 
partners were over the age of forty.91  An executive committee made the 
decision and demoted the thirty-two partners to “counsel” or “senior 
counsel.”92  The EEOC93 instituted an investigation to determine whether the 
demotions had anything to do with age.94  The EEOC filed suit against Sidley 
based on the firm’s practice of demoting or forcing older partners into 
retirement.95  “In its complaint, the [EEOC] charged that [Sidley] violated the 
ADEA by ‘maintaining and implementing, since at least 1978, an age-based 
retirement policy.’”96 
Under the ADEA, only employees are protected from discrimination.97  In 
response to the EEOC’s allegations, Sidley asserted that the ADEA did not 
apply to the thirty-two partners because they were employers and not 
employees.98  To determine whether the partners were employers or 
employees, the EEOC requested a subpoena duces tecum.99  The EEOC sought 
documents from Sidley, including information regarding coverage100 under the 
ADEA and discrimination.101 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 698–99 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 93. The EEOC enforces the federal statutes that prohibit employment discrimination.  U.S. 
Equal Opportunity Commission, supra note 1.  Further, the EEOC provides guidance and 
oversight over federal equal employment opportunities guidelines and procedures.  Id.  The 
EEOC has offered guidance to determine when partners and shareholders should be regarded as 
employees for the purposes of the federal anti-discrimination statutes.  Brief for the United States 
and the EEOC as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner in Part, Clackamas Gastroenterology 
Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003) (No. 01-1435), 2002 WL 31746517, at *8.  The 
EEOC has clearly established that a person’s title or rank does not determine whether that person 
is a partner or a shareholder versus an employee.  Id. at *8–9.  One of the main factors the EEOC 
analyzes to determine whether an individual is an employee is whether “the individual is subject 
to the organization’s control” or “whether the individual acts independently and participates in 
managing the organization.”  Id. at *9. 
 94. Sidley, 315 F.3d at 698. 
 95. Anthony Lin, EEOC Sues Sidley Austin Alleging Age Discrimination, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 14, 
2005, at 1. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Sidley, 315 F.3d at 698. 
 98. Id. at 698–99. 
 99. Id. at 698.  A “subpoena duces tecum” is “[a] subpoena ordering the witness to appear 
and to bring specified documents, records, or things.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1467 (8th ed. 
2004). 
 100. The EEOC sought documentation to determine whether the thirty-two partners were 
covered by the ADEA.  Sidley, 315 F.3d at 698.  In order for the thirty-two partners to be covered 
under the ADEA, the EEOC would have to show that they were employees prior to their 
demotion.  Id. 
 101. Id. 
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Particularly, the EEOC sought information regarding the employment 
status of the demoted partners, information pertaining to how the new 
retirement plan was developed, and the rationale for the demotions.102  Sidley 
presented a jurisdictional argument, asserting that its partners were not subject 
to EEOC regulation and refused to provide the EEOC with all of the requested 
information.103  Sidley argued that the EEOC had no jurisdiction because a 
partner is considered an employer under the ADEA if “(a) his income included 
a share of the firm’s profits, (b) he made a contribution to the capital of the 
firm, (c) he was liable for the firm’s debts, and (d) he has some administrative 
or managerial responsibilities—and all these things, the firm argues, have been 
proved.”104  Sidley asserted that the EEOC had no basis for the inquiry because 
the thirty-two demoted individuals were “real” partners,105 and therefore not 
covered under the federal statutes.106 
 
 102. Lovly & Mehnert, supra note 7, at 675.  The EEOC further sought 
names, dates of birth, hire and admission to partnership, current title, practice groups, 
billing rates, hours billed and amounts collected for a several-year period, compensation 
and evaluative materials, and dates and reasons for separation where applicable.  With 
respect to the 32 demoted partners, EEOC further seeks documentation for the reasons for 
the change of status, the date the partner was informed and the partner’s subsequent fate.  
Further, EEOC seeks information concerning retirement policies, formal or informal, 
which have been in effect at Sidley since 1970 and information about all partners who 
have retired under a retirement policy, including their compensation from two years 
before retirement to the present. 
EEOC v. Sidley & Austin, No. 01-C-9635, 2002 WL 206485, at *2 n.3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2002). 
 103. Sidley, 315 F.3d at 698–99.  Sidley defines a “true partner” as one that “contributes to 
capital, shares in the profits, is subject to the liabilities of the partnership, and participates in 
administration of the firm.”  Sidley, 2002 WL 206485, at *3 n.7.  However, the EEOC contends 
that a number of additional factors “may add or detract from the core elements of [a] partnership.”  
Id.  Specifically, Sidley refused to provide a copy of the retirement plan, profiles of the partners, 
and information regarding its past retirement policies.  Id. at *2. 
 104. Sidley, 315 F.3d at 699. 
 105. Id. at 698–99.  Although no statutory definition establishes what constitutes a “real” 
partner, Section 541.1 of the Fair Labor Standards Act defines a “bona fide executive” as an 
individual: 
(a) Whose primary duty consists of the management of the enterprise in which he is 
employed or of a customarily recognized department of subdivision thereof; and 
(b) Who customarily and regularly directs the work of two or more other employees 
therein; and 
(c) Who has the authority to hire or fire other employees or whose suggestions and 
recommendations as to the hiring or firing and as to the advancement and promotion or 
any other change of status of other employees will be given particular weight; and 
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The district court ordered Sidley to comply with the subpoena, 
acknowledging that the Supreme Court has stated that the EEOC has the 
authority to initiate an investigation for alleged violations of the ADEA.107  
The court further held that “where jurisdictional [or] coverage facts are 
incomplete, the court will enforce the subpoena.”108 
Sidley appealed to the Seventh Circuit, again asserting that the EEOC 
lacked jurisdiction to bring suit.109  The Seventh Circuit ordered Sidley to 
comply with the subpoena to the extent that it sought information regarding 
coverage and the applicability of the ADEA to the thirty-two partners.110  The 
court remanded and ordered the district court to determine whether the thirty-
two partners were employers or employees, and thus, whether they were 
covered under the ADEA.111 
In Sidley, the court established that employers cannot evade anti-
discrimination law simply by labeling employees “partners.”112  The court 
questioned the legitimacy of Sidley’s claim that the thirty-two persons were 
full-fledged partners.113  One of the reasons the court questioned the status of 
the thirty-two as partners was the unequal distribution of power.114  At Sidley, 
a self-perpetuating executive committee had the majority of the decision-
making power.115  This committee, merely thirty-six of the over 500 Sidley 
partners, had complete power over the hiring, firing, and demotion of the 
thirty-two partners.116  In addition, any committee decisions made by the 
thirty-two demoted partners were subject to the control of the executive 
committee.117 
The court’s decision to issue the subpoena demonstrates the court’s 
willingness to conclude that under certain circumstances even individuals that 
 
(d) Who customarily and regularly exercises discretionary powers; and 
(e) Who does not devote more than 20 percent . . . [of his or her] workweek to activities 
which are not directly and closely related to the performance of the work described . . . . 
29 C.F.R. § 541.1 (2003); see Joel Bannister, Comment, In Search of a Title: When Should 
Partners be Considered “Employees” for Purposes of Federal Employment Antidiscrimination 
Statutes?, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 257, 272 (2004). 
 106. See Sidley, 2002 WL 206485, at *2. 
 107. Id. at *1 nn.2 & 4 (noting that the Supreme Court recognized this principle in Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991)). 
 108. Id. at *2 n.5. 
 109. EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 110. Id. at 707. 
 111. Id.  
 112. Id. at 709 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
 113. See, e.g., id. at 703 (majority opinion). 
 114. Sidley, 315 F.3d at 702–03. 
 115. Id. at 699, 702–03. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 699. 
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are labeled “partners” may, nevertheless, be employees for the purposes of 
coverage under federal anti-discrimination laws.  Currently, many courts, 
including the Seventh Circuit, remain without a legitimate test to deal with the 
issues presented in Sidley.  Therefore, courts will likely look to the Supreme 
Court, primarily Clackamas, for guidance. 
B. The Clackamas Common Law Control Test 
In deciding Sidley, the district court should have applied the control test 
established in Clackamas because it provides the only clear guidance from the 
Supreme Court.  Application of the control test should subdue some of the 
confusion among the circuits regarding how to make the employer/employee 
distinction.  It appears that in the Clackamas decision, the Supreme Court 
somewhat settled the circuit split by following the six-factor test established by 
the EEOC.118  The six-factor test establishes guidelines to determine whether a 
shareholder/director is an employee.119  Although the decision provides courts 
with a better understanding of who qualifies as an employee for the purposes 
of establishing liability under the federal anti-discrimination acts, the decision 
allows for a fair amount of latitude in interpreting and applying the six 
factors.120 
Now, even though some guidance exists, there is still a lack of 
predictability in applying the control test.  Courts can interpret the six-factor 
test broadly, narrowly, or as the court sees fit.  Nevertheless, the guidance 
provided by Clackamas gives all circuit courts a framework from which to 
work and a standard to uphold.  The EEOC guidance endorsed by the Supreme 
Court in Clackamas will protect individuals “who, despite their titles, remain 
vulnerable to the kinds of treatment prohibited by the [anti-discrimination 
acts].”121  Accordingly, the guidance applies to partnerships and its partners as 
well as to director/shareholders.122  The decision may not lead to predictable 
results in all cases, but the decision will make the employer/employee 
distinction easier to determine. 
For example, after the Clackamas decision, it was established that 
partnerships are not automatically exempt from coverage under the 
employment discrimination statutes.123  Particularly, Clackamas established 
that if an executive, partner, or shareholder is subject to an organization’s or 
 
 118. Supreme Court Settles Circuit Schism on the Issue of Shareholders and Directors as 
“Employees” for the Purposes of Liability Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, GIBBONS, 
July 9, 2003. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See id.  Ambiguities brought about by the decision will inevitably leave some discretion 
to judicial decision-makers.  See Bannister, supra note 105, at 261–62. 
 121. Crispin, supra note 30, at 8. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
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partnership’s control, then the person should be considered an employee and 
not an employer.124  Therefore, in the Sidley case, it appears that the EEOC has 
a compelling argument that the thirty-two partners were partners in title only 
and that they should be protected under the federal anti-discrimination 
statutes.125  Further, Clackamas established that the EEOC’s six-factor control 
test should be applied in making the employer/employee distinction.126  The 
control test furthers the policy goals of the anti-discrimination statutes by 
compelling courts to apply a factors test on a case-by-case basis.  In applying 
the control test, the policy behind the anti-discrimination statues is furthered 
because more people will be protected under the statues.  Through application 
of the test and through a totality of the circumstances analysis, courts will be 
able to determine whether a particular plaintiff is in need of and entitled to 
protection. 
C. Cases Following the Clackamas Decision 
It appears that the circuit courts are following the control test and EEOC 
guidelines established in the 2003 Supreme Court Clackamas decision.  
Nevertheless, there is no bright-line rule to determine the employer/employee 
distinction; therefore each decision will be made on a case-by-case basis. 
In the 2005 decision Solon v. Kaplan,127 the Seventh Circuit addressed the 
question of whether a partner (Solon) of a law firm was an employee, for the 
purposes of determining whether he was entitled to sue for retaliation under 
Title VII.128  The record established that Solon was one of four general 
partners and that he exercised substantial control over allocation of the firm’s 
profits, partnership agreements, and dissolution of the firm.129  In addition, 
Solon had hiring and firing powers, voting rights, and an equity interest in the 
firm’s profits.130  The court applied the Clackamas control test.131  After 
applying the control test, the court concluded that no reasonable juror could 
find that Solon was an employee of the firm.132 
In the 2004 decision Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,133 the Fifth Circuit utilized 
the Clackamas control test in the court’s analysis of the district court’s 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. at 5; see also U.S. Equal Opportunity Commission, supra note 1 (stating that age 
discrimination in employment is prohibited by the ADEA). 
 126. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449–50 (2003). 
 127. 398 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 128. Id. at 630. 
 129. Id. at 630–31, 633. 
 130. Id. at 633–34. 
 131. Id. at 633. 
 132. Solon, 398 F.3d at 633. 
 133. 380 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 2004). 
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opinion.134  In the district court, the plaintiff (Arbaugh), who had filed a sexual 
harassment suit, argued that the owners of a restaurant and their wives were 
employees under Title VII.135  On appeal, Arbaugh primarily argued that the 
owners’ wives were employees of the restaurant.136  The court looked to the 
following factors in reaching its conclusion: the wives were not designated as 
employees, and the wives, along with their husbands, shared in the restaurant’s 
profits, losses, and liabilities.137  The Fifth Circuit applied the six-factor control 
test established in Clackamas to the facts of the case and concluded that the 
district court reached the correct decision in finding that neither the owners of 
the restaurant nor their wives were employees.138 
Similarly, in the 2004 Second Circuit decision Rodal v. Anesthesia Group 
of Onondaga, P.C.,139 the Clackamas control test was once again utilized.140  
The Second Circuit remanded, finding that in light of the Clackamas decision, 
discovery should be reopened.141  The court ordered the district court to 
determine, through applying the six-factor Clackamas control test, whether a 
doctor was an employee of an anesthesia group and thus entitled to the 
protections of the ADA.142 
IV.  ANALYSIS: WHY THE THIRTY-TWO SIDLEY PARTNERS ARE EMPLOYEES 
A. The Sidley Case and the Control Test 
Solon clearly demonstrates that the Seventh Circuit adheres to the 
Clackamas control test in making the employer/employee distinction.  
Therefore, in Sidley, upon remand by the Seventh Circuit, the district court will 
most likely apply the control test in deciding the case.  However, the outcome 
in Sidley will probably be different from the outcome in Solon because the 
facts in Sidley are easily distinguishable.  For example, in Solon, the facts 
clearly established that Solon had substantial power within the partnership on 
all operational levels.143  Solon had control in areas ranging from hiring and 
firing to monetary decisions.144  For these reasons, Solon was clearly an 
employer under the control test.  On the other hand, the questions in Sidley 
 
 134. Id. at 230. 
 135. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., No. Civ.A. 01-3376, 2003 WL 1797893, at *1,*7 (E.D. La. 
April 3, 2003). 
 136. Arbaugh, 380 F.3d at 229. 
 137. Id. at 230. 
 138. Id. 
 139. 369 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 140. Id. at 123. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See Solon v. Kaplan, 398 F.3d 629, 630–31 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 144. See id. at 630–31, 634. 
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surround the balance of power and profit sharing of the thirty-two partners.  In 
addition, the record establishes that the thirty-two partners had very limited 
voting rights and no voice in hiring or firing decisions.145  On a prima facie 
case basis, the thirty-two partners in Sidley had much less power than the 
partner in Solon. 
Courts are embracing the common-law control test as the principal 
guidepost in making the employer/employee distinction in employment 
discrimination cases.146  Many factors in Sidley point to the conclusion that the 
thirty-two partners did not possess sufficient authority to be considered 
employers.  Applying the six EEOC factors adopted in Clackamas, it appears 
that the thirty-two partners were employees. 
1. Are the Individuals Supervised? 
Courts must analyze whether and to what extent the organization 
supervises the individual’s work.147  At Sidley, the thirty-two demoted 
partners’ work was closely supervised by the law firm’s executive 
committee.148  In Sidley, Judge Posner “pointed to the highly centralized 
management of [Sidley], in which partners never voted on issues, and a self-
selecting executive committee made all major decisions, in suggesting that the 
partners could, in fact, be employees.”149  In addition to this unequal balance of 
power, the executive committee oversaw all hiring, firing, promotions, 
 
 145. EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 699, 702–03 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 146. But cf. Colangelo v. Motion Picture Projectionists, Operators & Video Technicians, 
Local 110, No. 01-C-9417, 2004 WL 406770, *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2004) (distinguishing 
Clackamas on the grounds that Clackamas dealt with a corporation and director-shareholders 
rather than a union and its board members).  However, according to EEOC guidance, which was 
adopted by the Court in Clackamas, the same analysis that applies to corporation/director-
shareholders applies to a partnership and its partners.  See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., 
P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 450 (2003); Crispin, supra note 30, at 8. 
 147. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 450.  The EEOC advocated a six-factor test to consider the 
question of whether an individual is subject to an organization’s control.  The non-exhaustive list 
contains the following: (1) “Whether and, if so, to what extent the organization supervises the 
individual’s work,” (2) “Whether the individual reports to someone higher in the organization,” 
(3) “Whether and, if so, to what extent the individual is able to influence the organization,” (4) 
“Whether the parties intended that the individual be an employee, as expressed in written 
agreements or contracts,” (5) “Whether the organization can hire or fire the individual, or 
establish rules and regulations of the individual’s work,” and (6) “Whether the individual shares 
in the profits, losses, and liabilities of the organization.”  Id. 
 148. See Sidley, 315 F.3d at 699. 
 149. Lin, supra note 95.  Judge Posner said, “[T]he question . . . is not whether Sidley is a 
partnership; it is.  The question is whether when, a firm employs the latitude allowed to it by state 
law to reconfigure a partnership in the direction of making it a de facto corporation, a federal 
agency enforcing federal antidiscrimination law is compelled to treat all the ‘partners’ as 
employers.”  Sidley, 315 F.3d at 705. 
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demotions, and compensation.150  Inevitably, the committee monitored each 
partner’s workload.151  Sidley scrutinized the work of the thirty-two partners, 
and stated that the demotions were due to “shortcomings in performance.”152  
Through making this statement, Sidley admitted to supervising the thirty-two 
partners’ work. 
2. Do the Individuals Report to Someone Higher? 
Courts must analyze whether the individuals report to someone higher in 
the organization.153  The thirty-two partners were by no means autonomous.  In 
Sidley, the thirty-two partners had to answer to higher-level partners—the 
members of the executive committee.154  None of the demoted partners were 
on the all-powerful executive committee; the committee that decided to demote 
the partners.155  In addition, any decisions made by the thirty-two partners were 
subject to the veto power of the executive committee.156  At Sidley, the 
partners always had someone higher looking over their shoulders. 
The ADEA is inapplicable only to “a very few top level employees who 
exercise substantial executive authority over a significant number of 
employees and a large volume of business.”157  The ADEA is applicable in 
Sidley because the stipulated facts demonstrate that the thirty-two demoted 
partners were not top-level officials; they were subjected to the decisions of the 
executive committee.158  Further, the ADEA is applicable in Sidley because the 
demoted partners did not exercise significant control over firm business by any 
stretch of the imagination. 
3. Do the Individuals Influence the Organization? 
Courts must analyze whether the individuals were able to influence the 
organization.159  In Sidley, the record clearly establishes that the thirty-two 
partners had minimal if any influential power over decision-making.160  The 
only inkling of power granted to the thirty-two partners was their ability to 
serve on committees.161  All decisions reached by committees, however, were 
 
 150. Sidley, 315 F.3d at 699. 
 151. See id. 
 152. Id. at 698. 
 153. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 450 (2003). 
 154. Sidley, 315 F.3d at 699, 702–03. 
 155. See id. 
 156. See id. 
 157. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.12(d)(2) (2003). 
 158. See Sidley, 315 F.3d at 699. 
 159. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 450 (2003). 
 160. See Sidley, 315 F.3d at 699. 
 161. Id. 
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subject to the control of the executive committee.162  In addition, the partners 
had no say whatsoever regarding their fate at the firm, no vote, and no voice.163  
Their status at the firm was 100% in the hands of the thirty-six member 
executive committee.164 
Under the ADEA, individuals that play a significant role in the 
development, recommendation, and implementation of corporate policy are 
exempt from protection under the Act.165  However, the ADEA does protect 
middle-management and individuals with moderate levels of control over the 
business.166  At Sidley, the thirty-two partners at best had moderate levels of 
control over the firm. 
4. Did the Parties Intend the Individuals to be Employees? 
Courts must analyze whether the parties intended the individuals to be 
employees.167  Clearly, Sidley intended, at least on paper, for the thirty-two 
partners to be employers.  However, the EEOC contends that even when an 
individual signs a partnership agreement, if the individual lacks substantial 
control over the business, the individual should be considered an employee.168  
Further, the Supreme Court established in Clackamas that a firm cannot, by 
affixing the label “partner” to someone who is functionally an employee, avoid 
federal antidiscrimination law.169  The important point is that regardless of the 
language of the partnership agreement, Sidley did not give the thirty-two 
partners sufficient power to render them real partners; therefore they should be 
considered employees. 
5. Could the Organization Hire or Fire the Individuals? 
Courts must analyze whether the organization can hire or fire 
individuals.170  At Sidley, the firm’s executive committee made decisions 
regarding the hiring, firing, and promotion of partners and associates.171  The 
record in Sidley clearly establishes that the thirty-two demoted partners had 
little hiring and firing powers.172  In fact, on most employment issues, they 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. See id. 
 164. Id. at 699, 702–03.  
 165. See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.12(d) (2003). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 450 (2003). 
 168. A Rose by Any Other Name: Keeping Partners and Professional Shareholders From 
Becoming Employees, EMP. L. BRIEFINGS (Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold LLP, Chi., Ill.), 
Feb. 2005, available at http://www.sdma.com/Publications/detail.aspx?pub=4130 (select link to 
“February 2005 (pdf)”) [hereinafter EMP. L. BRIEFINGS]. 
 169. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449. 
 170. Id. at 450. 
 171. See EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 172. See id. 
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were not even given a vote.  Most importantly, the hiring, firing, and demotion 
of the thirty-two demoted partners was in the sole discretion of the executive 
committee.173 
6. Do the Individuals Share in Profits and Losses? 
Courts must analyze whether the individuals share in the profits, losses, 
and liabilities of the organization.174  Even if the court determines that the 
thirty-two demoted partners shared in the profits and losses of Sidley, this 
factor alone is not decisive.  In Sidley, one of the firm’s main arguments was 
that the EEOC had no jurisdiction to bring suit on behalf of the thirty-two 
partners because they were employers, not employees protected by the federal 
anti-discrimination laws, for the following reasons: (1) they shared in the 
firm’s profits, (2) they contributed to the capital of the firm, (3) they were 
liable for the firm’s debts, and (4) they had some administrative 
responsibilities.175  However, the EEOC maintains that even where an 
individual has equity ownership, liability, and profit-sharing rights, to the 
extent that the individual is subject to the supervision of another and has little 
influence over business decisions, the individual should be considered an 
employee.176  Further, under the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA),177 a 
distinguishing characteristic of partnership is that partners share equally in 
profits.178  In Sidley, the thirty-two partners’ profits were determined by the 
executive committee.179  Therefore, profits were not distributed equally among 
 
 173. See id. 
 174. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 450. 
 175. Sidley, 315 F.3d at 699. 
 176. EMP. L. BRIEFINGS, supra note 168. 
 177. Under the Uniform Partnership Act, common characteristics of a partnership include the 
following: 
(1) The partners share equally in profits and losses . . . ; (2) they have equal rights in the 
management and conduct of the partnership business . . . ; (3) every partner is an agent of 
the partnership, and entitled to bind the other partners by his acts, for the purpose of its 
business . . . ; (4) all partners are liable for the debts of the partnership . . . ; (5) a fiduciary 
relation exists between the partners . . . ; (6) all property brought into the partnership stock 
is partnership property . . . ; (7) on dissolution the partnership is not terminated, but 
continues until the winding up of partnership affairs is completed. 
E.H. Schopflocher, Partnership as Distinguished from Employment, 137 A.L.R. 6 (2004) 
(citations omitted). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Sidley, 315 F.3d at 699.  The thirty-two partners’ incomes were “determined by the 
number of percentage points of the firm’s overall profits that the executive committee assigned to 
each of them.”  Id. 
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the partners, indicating that Sidley did not follow traditional guidelines of 
partnership law.180 
The control test balances all six factors in making a final determination as 
to employment status.  As the Court noted in Clackamas, “[t]oday there are 
partnerships that include hundreds of members, some of whom may well 
qualify as ‘employees’ because control is concentrated in a small number of 
managing partners.”181  At Sidley, the title “partner” was a meaningless term 
that attempted to bring about a false sense of distribution of power, when really 
all the power was centralized in one body, the executive committee.  This was 
the case in Sidley, and the district court should hold that the thirty-two demoted 
partners at Sidley are in fact employees due to their lack of control and 
decision-making power. 
B. The Uniform Partnership Act Suggests the Partners are Employees 
Recent revisions to the UPA may have an impact in determining whether 
partners can be classified as employees with regard to the federal anti-
discrimination statutes.  The revised UPA, which has been adopted by a 
majority of the states, includes some provisions that appear to support a 
partner’s right to sue as an employee for discriminatory conduct.182  Under the 
revised UPA, partners can sue a partnership and a partnership may sue a 
partner.183  This opens the door to litigation and inevitably takes away the sting 
that might otherwise come from allowing partners to sue on the basis of 
 
 180. If profits are received as wages, no proof of partnership is said to exist.  See 
Schopflocher, supra note 177.  A party is not inferred to be a partner merely because he or she is 
given profits as part of compensation for services.  See id. 
 181. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 446 (2003).  The 
term “partner” no longer “invokes reassuring connotations of equality” across the board.  David 
B. Wilkins, Partners Without Power? A Preliminary Look at Black Partners in Corporate Law 
Firms, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 15, 16 (1999).  In many law firms, some partners 
clearly possess more power than others.  Id.  Many firms divide partners into two tiers, separating 
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are paid salaries.  Geri S. Krauss, The Nitty-Gritty on Equity, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 26, 2004.  Even 
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discrepancies in compensation and control amongst partners.  Id.  The traditional “one person one 
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 182. Stephanie M. Greene & Christine Neylon O’Brien, Partners and Shareholders as 
Covered Employees Under Federal Antidiscrimination Acts, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 781, 784, 808 
(2003). 
 183. Id. at 812.  “This right to sue permits actions during the term of the partnership and does 
not require dissolution in order to permit an action for an accounting.  Neither does it require an 
action for an accounting as a prerequisite to any suit.”  Id. at n.147; see also UNIFORM 
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 405(b) (1997). 
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discrimination.  The revised UPA allows partners to sue firms or partnerships 
generally; therefore no logical reason exists to prohibit partners from suing on 
the basis of discrimination. 
Further, the revised UPA emphasizes the importance of the entity 
theory.184  The Act states that under the entity theory, “a partnership is an 
entity distinct from its partners.”185  The entity theory, by recognizing “partners 
as distinct from the partnership,” increases the likelihood that a court will find 
a partner to be a covered employee under federal anti-discrimination 
statutes.186  The theory clearly separates a partner from a partnership, the 
former as an individual, and the latter as a business.  This important distinction 
demonstrates the revised Act’s attempt to establish that partners possess 
individual rights and are not definitively tied to the partnership. 
C. Partners as Employees: The Pros & Cons 
In organizations that employ hundreds of partners, the supposed “co-
owners of the company are, by necessity, so far removed from the seat of 
actual power as to be subject to the reach” of the offensive acts that anti-
discrimination law seeks to remedy.187  The Sidley decision may remedy this 
problem to a certain extent, by establishing that so-called “partners” can sue on 
the basis of discrimination in situations where partners lack significant control 
over the firm. 
There are arguments both for and against considering partners to be 
employees.  One argument against considering partners to be employees is that 
partnership relations could be poisoned if partners are allowed to sue each 
other for discrimination.188  However, conversely, partnership relationships 
will be ruined if partners are subjected to disparate treatment and are forced to 
bear discrimination without any hope of recourse. 
Another argument against considering partners to be employees is that 
because of Congress’s small business exception, partners of small businesses 
would never be protected by anti-discrimination statutes.189  Therefore, the 
 
 184. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT Prefatory Note (1997).  Although the revised UPA states 
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noted . . . that the aggregate approach, which views the partnership as a totality of persons rather 
than an entity in itself, is . . . retained in [the revised UPA] for some purposes, such as partners’ 
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 186. Greene & O’Brien, supra note 182, at 809. 
 187. Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 445 (6th Cir. 1996) (Daughtrey, J., 
concurring). 
 188. Robert W. Hillman, Law, Culture, and the Lore of Partnership: Of Entrepreneurs, 
Accountability, and the Evolving Status of Partners, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 822–23 
(2005). 
 189. Lauren Winters, Partners Without Power: Protecting Law Firm Partners From 
Discrimination, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 413, 435 n.178 (2005).  Congress enacted a small business 
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protection of partners under the Acts would be a moot point, because a portion 
of the population would be left unprotected.190  However, the small business 
exception applies only to “really small businesses.”191  A nominal numbers of 
partners work in very small firms.192  Therefore, allowing partners to be 
considered employees protects the great majority of the country’s partners. 
One of the main justifications for excluding partners from protection under 
the anti-discrimination statutes is that partners have other mechanisms under 
partnership law to protect themselves from disparate treatment.193  At Sidley, 
however, none of the thirty-two demoted partners had a way to protect 
themselves from the committee that decided to demote them.194  More 
importantly, the thirty-two partners had no vote in the decision on their 
demotion.195  The Sidley case is a perfect example of how partnership law 
gives partners no effective remedy against oppression by their fellow partners. 
Partners with little power or control, such as the thirty-two demoted 
partners at Sidley, should be classified as employees and covered under federal 
anti-discrimination statutes.  Regardless of how Sidley is decided, the outcome 
will likely impact how partnerships and executive committees operate their 
businesses. 
D. Why Sidley Matters 
Under the status quo, promotion from associate to partner can leave 
women, minorities, and older attorneys exposed to unlawful employment 
practices.196  Women and minorities have historically been discriminated 
against and excluded from partnership.197  Promotion of these groups may put 
them in a position where they have no method of recourse if faced with 
discrimination.198  In addition, older partners, often forced out when the 
economy takes a turn for the worse, also lack a method of recourse to combat 
blatant age discrimination.199  Currently, partners in these types of 
predicaments are usually forced to weigh the economic benefits of partnership 
 
exception to exempt small businesses from having to face suit under federal anti-discrimination 
law.  See id.  The rationale behind this policy is that Congress intended “to spare very small firms 
from the potentially crushing expense of mastering the intricacies of antidiscrimination laws, 
establishing procedures to assure compliance, and defending against suits when efforts at 
compliance fail.”  Id. (citing Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 1999)). 
 190. See id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See id. 
 193. Id. at 419. 
 194. See EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 195. See id. 
 196. Winters, supra note 189, at 419. 
 197. See id. at 435 n.177. 
 198. See id. at 419–20. 
 199. Firing Partners, 02-12 PARTNER’S REP. 4, Dec. 2002. 
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against the professional perils of being subjected to harassment.200  Ultimately, 
the partner has two choices: to leave the firm or to face harassment and 
humiliation.201  However, this could all change.  In Sidley, if the district court 
applies the Clackamas control test broadly, future courts may be encouraged to 
do the same.202  An expansive interpretation of the anti-discrimination acts 
would protect vulnerable groups in need of protection—groups such as 
women, minorities, and older attorneys. 
Regardless of whether the district court decides to apply the Clackamas 
control test narrowly, broadly, or at all, the court will need to determine what 
type of authority the thirty-two demoted partners possessed.  One possibility is 
that the district court in Sidley will determine the thirty-two partners are 
analogous to corporate executives, especially considering that in Sidley, the 
Seventh Circuit likened the thirty-two partners’ authority to the authority 
possessed by corporate executives, who are considered employees under 
federal law.203  After all, partners and business executives share several 
similarities including: (1) partners can commit a firm by writing opinion 
letters, just as corporate executives can commit a business to contractual 
obligations and tort liability, (2) both usually serve on administrative 
committees, and (3) partners own some firm capital, while corporate 
executives often share in profits by use of stock options in their 
corporations.204  If the district court determines that certain partners are 
analogous to corporate executives, law firms are likely to rethink the 
operational structures of their firms or even to make an effort to distinguish 
partners from corporate executives in partnership agreements. 
The Sidley decision will also affect how partnerships and organizations run 
their businesses,205 especially since the EEOC can now file employment 
discrimination suits even when the victims waive their personal right to sue.206  
 
 200. See Winters, supra note 189, at 419. 
 201. See id. at 419–20. 
 202. “[A] broad reading of the term ‘employee’ [is] consistent with the statutory purpose of 
ridding the Nation of [unlawful workplace] discrimination.”  Clackamas Gastroenterology 
Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 446 n.6 (2003). 
 203. See Are Partners Employees?, ILL. EMP. L. LETTER, Mar. 2003.   
 204. Id. 
 205. The Sidley decision will likely alter the entire litigation process with respect to the 
employer/employee distinction.  Following Sidley, it appears that a plaintiff will need to address 
the issue of coverage under federal anti-discrimination laws from the outset of a case in situations 
where a plaintiff is a partner, shareholder, or high-level executive.  Plaintiffs should address 
control issues in the early stages of discovery so plaintiffs are prepared to combat a motion to 
dismiss or a motion for summary judgment, motions that will likely be filed by the opposition.  
Crispin, supra note 30, at 8. 
 206. Joanna Grossman, Are Law Firm Partners “Employers” for Purposes of Discrimination 
Law? A Federal Court of Appeals Suggests They May Not Be, FINDLAW, Dec. 17, 2002, 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20021217.html.  The Supreme Court made the 
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Partnerships now have to worry about both the EEOC and their own members 
filing employment discrimination suits.207  Ultimately, professional 
corporations and partnerships have to play by the rules, or else adverse action 
taken against partners may be challenged under federal anti-discrimination 
laws.208  In order to play by the rules, most firms will have to make some 
major changes. 
E. Suggestions for the Problem 
The increasingly corporate-style management that many large law firms 
have adopted includes a greater risk that partners will be classified as 
employees.209  There are, however, a few preemptive measures that firms can 
take as a means of damage control.  First, firms should consider the control test 
in Clackamas when structuring their partnerships and executive committees.210  
Second, firms should involve all partners in the decision-making of central 
issues.211  Third, firms should allow all partners to vote on promotions, 
demotions, and lateral hires.212  Fourth and finally, all partners should have a 
voice in important issues such as allocation of shares and retirement.213  If 
partnerships fail to take these precautions, they may end up paying for it in the 
long run—literally. 
F. Putting It All Together 
Law firms have changed.  Firms have grown in size and in structure, and 
many have even created several tiers of partnership.214  The majority of larger 
firms, including Sidley, have centralized power structures and decision-making 
is devolved on a small executive committee.215  The inevitable truth is that the 
thirty-two demoted partners at Sidley were not true partners at all.  In fact the 
only true partners—the only employers—were the thirty-six powerful 
attorneys that headed the executive committee.216  Sidley conducted only one 
firm-wide vote in the past twenty-five years.217  Other than that, all major 
 
determination as to the EEOC’s power to sue in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. 
Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002).  Id. 
 207. Grossman, supra note 206. 
 208. Olson & Mercer, supra note 2. 
 209. Paul F. Mickey Jr., Treat Your Partners Well, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 22, 2003, at 2. 
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decisions were made or finalized by the executive committee.218  Further, in 
Sidley, the thirty-two demoted partners lacked the pivotal privilege of 
partnership: “co-equal control and power over the firm.”219  Under traditional 
partnership law, there is a common understanding that decisions affecting the 
firm will be made by the agreement of all partners.220  In partnerships, partners 
are supposed to act upon the “joint opinion of all.”221  Sidley does not follow 
the traditional tenets of partnership law.  Since Sidley does not operate a 
traditional partnership, it does not “deserve the immunities granted to [a] 
traditional [partnership].”222 
CONCLUSION 
As large law firms continue to expand, the majority of partners appear 
more like employees and less like employers.223  Without a clear statutory 
definition of the term “employee” or definitive case law on the question, it is 
difficult to make the employer/employee distinction.  The best guidance is the 
Clackamas decision, which applies the control test.  The control test indicates 
that law firm partners that do not possess substantial control, and decision-
making power within their firm should be considered employees and should be 
protected under the federal anti-discrimination statutes. 
In the Sidley decision, the district court is likely to apply the Clackamas 
control test.  The court will likely conclude that the thirty-two demoted 
partners were in fact employees due to their lack of control, voting rights, and 
decision-making power.  Ideally, the decision will shed some light on how to 
make the employer/employee distinction.  In the meantime, it may be prudent 
for firms to err on the side of caution by assuming that all partners are 
employees for the purposes of the federal anti-discrimination statutes.224 
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